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(13) 
USING ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS TO STUDY PROSECUTORIAL ERROR: 
A COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
(PENNSYLVANIA) DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE AND THE 
QUATTRONE CENTER FOR THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
STEVEN E. RAPER, MD, JD; LEE A. FLEISHER, MD; DAVID L. MAYER, PHD; THE 
HONORABLE RISA V. FERMAN; KEVIN STEELE, JD; & JOHN HOLLWAY, JD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
rosecutors are expected to be more than advocates enforcing the criminal 
laws of a particular jurisdiction; they are ministers of justice.1  District 
attorneys’ (DA’s) offices across the country constantly strive to manage their 
caseloads with the highest reliability, accuracy, and integrity, representing not 
only victims of crime and their families, but also the community at large.  Many 
prosecutors’ offices also oversee criminal investigations and provide legal 
guidance and charging decisions to law enforcement personnel.  This provision 
of oversight and guidance requires the creation and maintenance of policies, 
procedures, and standards that enforce the laws, while protecting the rights of 
victims and the rights of those accused of crimes, and ensuring fairness to all.  
Put differently, it is not enough to charge and convict those who have 
committed crimes; any prosecutors’ office must also maintain the highest 
ethical standards and conduct itself in a manner that is above reproach and 
complies with all laws and constitutional mandates. 
In a criminal investigation related to the alleged rape of an unconscious 
victim, members of the investigative team misread a laboratory report.  The 
interpretive error was presented during a court proceeding and to a Magisterial 
District Justice during a preliminary hearing.  Once the interpretive error was 
discovered, the District Attorney concluded that the case presented to the court 
proceeding was unintentionally corrupted and could not proceed, 
notwithstanding her conclusion that there was sufficient independent evidence 
to support most of the charges.  This conclusion led the District Attorney to 
withdraw the charges as filed.  In addition, the District Attorney concluded that 
the interpretive error impaired the ability of the Montgomery County District 
Attorney’s Office to prosecute the case or effectively serve as a minister of 
justice, causing the Office to refer the investigation to the Office of the Attorney 
General (AG) of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for consideration of 
whether new charges should be re-filed against the defendant.2  In order to learn 
 
1.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor/comment_on_rule_3
_8.html [https://perma.cc/MD56-GYQQ] (noting prosecutors have obligations to see 
defendants get procedural justice, sufficient evidence is present to decide guilt, and innocents 
receive special precautions to prevent or rectify conviction). 
2.  See Martha Neil, Prominent Attorney Now Faces AG Prosecution of Rape Case, 
After Charges Were Dropped in March by DA, A.B.A. J., (Apr. 25, 2014, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/prominent_attorney_now_faces_ag_prosecution_of_r
P 
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from this error, and in furtherance of the prosecutor’s ethical obligations of 
(a) conviction integrity, (b) transparency and accountability, and (c) a culture of 
continuous self-improvement within the Office, the District Attorney partnered 
with the interdisciplinary Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of 
Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School to conduct a Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) of the error.  The goal of the RCA was to identify specific 
activities, policies, procedures, and environmental factors that allowed the error 
to occur, and to implement changes that would prevent similar errors from 
occurring in the future.  In this way, the District Attorney sought to promote the 
highest levels of accuracy, reliability, fairness, accountability, and integrity in 
the handling of criminal cases throughout her office and the law enforcement 
community. 
A. The Parties 
1. The Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office 
The Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office (DA’s Office) is 
comprised of forty-five attorneys, forty-two support staff, and fifty-seven 
detectives and investigators.  The District Attorney is considered the Chief Law 
Enforcement Officer of the county in which he/she is elected to serve.  Cases 
are referred to the District Attorney by forty-nine local police departments and 
the Montgomery County Detective Bureau (MCDB), which is a part of the 
DA’s Office.  In 2015, the Office brought 9,107 cases to final disposition, a 
number that has remained fairly stable for the past several years. 
2. The Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice 
A national leader in the application of a systems approach to error 
reduction in the administration of justice, the Quattrone Center for the Fair 
Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
comprises investigators from the fields of medicine, transportation, and law.  
Each member of the team has experience in conducting RCAs in his/her 
respective field. 
B. Process 
Given the number and complexity of cases handled by any DA’s office, it 
is to be expected that human errors will occur.  There is no reliable source of 
data as to error rates for all criminal convictions.  Given the relative lack of data 
regarding errors in law enforcement, a comparison can be drawn to a more 
robust dataset in healthcare.  The Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of Inspector General found that 0.6% of Medicare beneficiaries had a 
National Quality Forum (NQF) Serious Reportable Event, 1.0% had a Medicare 
Hospital Acquired Condition (HAC) event, and 13.1% experienced an adverse 
 
ape_case_after_charges_were/ [https://perma.cc/MY9W-486G].  
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss6/2
2017] ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 15 
event resulting in one of the four most serious categories of patient harm.3  Like 
healthcare and other complex industries (e.g., aviation), criminal justice 
professionals and those in the communities they serve should also strive for 
zero errors.  Errors in the administration of justice may allow the perpetrator of 
a crime to escape accountability for his/her actions or could incarcerate an 
innocent person.  Either of these outcomes is unacceptable.4 
The current rate of human error in criminal justice is unknown, and 
reasonable minds may differ as to the acceptable rate of human error in the 
administration of justice.  Even so, it seems clear that responsible criminal 
justice professionals should be dedicated to the goal of preventing such errors 
wherever possible, which requires learning from errors that do occur and 
putting in place processes to prevent or mitigate errors.  Error-reduction 
strategies are thus one element essential to maintaining the trust and support of 
the public that law enforcement is sworn to serve. 
In addition to actual errors with impact on the prosecutors, investigators 
and others involved, there is a related class of error, the near miss.  A near miss 
may describe what the DA’s Office experienced in this case.  Since no one was 
wrongfully convicted, one could view this as a near miss; on the other hand, 
since an individual was charged, in-part, based on misinterpreted evidence, one 
could view this as an error.  Either way, additional review was warranted to 
avoid repeating an undesirable result.  A near miss in healthcare has been 
defined by the NQF as “an event or a situation that did not produce patient 
harm.”5  The National Transportation Safety Board has a similar definition in 
aviation: “[A]n occurrence . . . associated with the operation of an aircraft, 
which affects or could affect the safety of operations.”6 
The interpretive error during investigation of the criminal case described in 
this document, however, did affect the outcome in a very public manner.  As a 
result, the Montgomery County District Attorney sought an objective and 
thorough review of the case, along with practical recommendations for process 
and environmental improvements that could be implemented within the Office.  
She requested that the Quattrone Center provide expertise in Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) to satisfy these goals. 
The Quattrone Center assembled an RCA team, consisting in-part of the 
authors of this paper, who collectively have experience in criminal procedure 
and in conducting RCAs in healthcare and transportation environments.  The 
RCA team met with an investigation team created by the District Attorney, 
consisting of the District Attorney, First Assistant District Attorney (ADA), 
 
3.  See Daniel R. Levinson, Adverse Events in Hospitals: National Incidence Among 
Medicare Beneficiaries, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 15, (Nov. 2010), 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-09-00090.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD84-F2B9]. 
4.  See THOMAS PYZDEK & PAUL KELLER, SIX SIGMA HANDBOOK 3 (4th ed. 2014) 
(discussing industrial concept of six sigma; that error rates greater than one in 3.4 errors per 
million opportunities are considered unacceptable). 
5.  See NQF Patient Safety Terms and Definitions, Nat’l Quality Forum, 
https://www.qualityforum.org/Topics/Safety_Definitions.aspx [https://perma.cc/2EY6-ZE9M] 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
6.  See 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (2016) (emphasis added). 
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Chief County Detective, and Deputy Chief County Detective, to review the 
investigative and prosecutorial components of the case.  Based on the facts 
provided by the DA’s investigative team, and applying the principles of RCA 
and just culture event reviews articulated in this document, the RCA team 
identified specific areas for evaluation by the DA’s Office and created a 
recommended action plan to reduce the possibility of future error.  A primary 
focus was placed upon investigation management and supervision, evidentiary 
analysis, case workload, teamwork, and communication.  The DA and her 
senior management reviewed the recommendations of the RCA team and 
consulted with the RCA team on issues of implementation and communication 
within the Office to ensure a contextual fit between the implementation of the 
recommendations and the culture of the Office. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND THEIR APPLICATION TO 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Before proceeding to the application of RCA to criminal justice, it is useful 
to develop a vocabulary classifying various types of unintended outcomes that 
may occur in complex human systems, such as healthcare, that have benefitted 
from RCA as a quality improvement tool.  Error can be either the failure of a 
planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to 
achieve an aim.7  Defined in this way, errors are generally unintentional 
(negligent, accidental, or otherwise unavoidable), while misconduct can be 
thought of as the intentional or reckless conduct of an individual or group of 
individuals.  In healthcare, the term sentinel events is used to describe 
unexpected occurrences—or the risk thereof—involving “death or serious 
physical or psychological injury.”8  Such events signal the need for immediate 
investigation and response, as does any process for which a “recurrence would 
carry a significant chance of a [similar] serious adverse event.”9  The terms 
error and sentinel event are not synonymous.  Not all sentinel events occur 
because of an error, and not all errors result in sentinel events.  A related 
definition is that of the near miss: a variation in process that did not affect—but 
for which a recurrence could increase—the chance of an undesired or adverse 
outcome.10 
Applying these terms to the administration of criminal justice, it becomes 
clear that much of the research on errors in criminal justice to date has focused 
on errors at the conviction stage of a criminal adjudication.  In a study 
conducted by Gould and associates, for example, two categories were defined 
for factually-innocent defendants who were indicted for violent felonies but 
subsequently relieved of all legal responsibility.11  The paper used “erroneous 
 
7.  See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 9 (1990). 
8.  See NQF Patient Safety Terms and Definitions, supra note 5. 
9.  See id. 
10.  See Larry E. Poniatowski, Patient Safety and Error Reductions Standards: The 
JCAHO Response to the IOM Report, in THE PATIENT SAFETY HANDBOOK 131 (Barbara J 
Youngberg & Martin J Hatlie eds., 2004).  
11.  See Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions: A Social Science 
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convictions” to describe defendants exonerated after conviction,12 and defined 
“near misses” as those cases in which defendants had charges dismissed or 
acquitted before conviction on the basis of “factual innocence.”13  Factual 
innocence, in turn, required both acknowledgement that the defendant did not 
commit the crime and evidence that would convince a reasonable person that 
the individual did not commit the crime.14 
To improve the criminal justice system, errors in criminal justice should be 
defined more broadly than the academic focus to date might suggest.  This 
broader definition would include as error, for example, an incorrect allegation 
of criminal behavior that prevented law enforcement from further investigation 
of that behavior, as occurred in the case discussed infra, whether such allegation 
was “wrongful” in the sense of being intentional or reckless or merely 
“erroneous” in the sense of being inaccurate but made in good faith at the time 
it was made.  In both instances, an adverse event—an outcome unintended by a 
perfectly efficient criminal justice system—occurred.  To identify the 
appropriate actions necessary to effectively prevent the future recurrence of the 
adverse event, a more detailed understanding of the actors, the environment, 
and the motives behind the decisions made that led to the adverse event is 
required. 
III. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
Although systems and processes may need to be tailored to customs within 
local organizations, the basic principles of systems improvement have proven to 
be generalizable not only across organizations, but across industries, and 
lessons learned from their application have proven to be widely applicable.  
RCA has been used productively not only throughout the healthcare industry, 
but also in aviation, manufacturing, and other quality-minded industries to 
conduct event reviews that lead to actionable change of policies and procedures 
to reduce the occurrence of adverse events.15  The use of RCA in healthcare is 
more recent, beginning with its use by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) and the Joint Commission in the mid-1990s.16  With implications for law 
 
Approach to Miscarriages of Justice 38–39 (Dec. 2012), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241389.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QFT-JX6Y] 
(identifying ten factors that reportedly separated conviction errors from near misses). 
12.  See id. 
13.  See id. 
14.  See id. 
15.  See generally Root Cause Analysis, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY 
(July 2016), https://psnet.ahrq.gov/primers/primer/10/root-cause-analysis 
[https://perma.cc/9275-675Z] (discussing root cause analysis in healthcare industry); FAA 
OFFICE OF AVIATION MED., Root Cause Analysis of Rule Violations by Aviation Maintenance 
Technicians FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (May 31, 2002), 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_factors
_maintenance/root_cause_analysis_of_rule_violations_by_aviation_maintenance_technicians.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5LF2-4EZ8] (discussing root cause analysis in aviation industry). 
16.  See Albert W. Wu et al., Effectiveness and Efficiency of Root Cause Analysis in 
Medicine, 299 J. AM. MED ASS’N 685, 685 (2008); see also James P. Bagian et al., The 
Veterans Affairs Root Cause Analysis System in Action, 28 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY 
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enforcement at the state and federal level, the Veterans Health Administration 
(VHA) has mandated that all VA RCA be submitted to the National Center for 
Patient Safety (NCPS), so that the NCPS can review and analyze data about 
serious adverse events from RCA data from across the country.17 
The goal of RCA is to learn from adverse events and “near misses” and to 
implement proactive change in order to reduce further similar events that might 
compromise—in the case of the law—lab report or opinion integrity.18  An 
important feature of the RCA is that it is a blame-free analysis: “[b]laming and 
punishing for errors that are made by well-intentioned people . . . drives the 
problem of iatrogenic harm underground and alienates people who are best 
placed to prevent such problems from recurring.”19  Given its formality, RCA is 
typically reserved for high- to moderate-impact events occurring with 
occasional to moderate frequency.20  The primary concept of RCA is to identify 
underlying systems problems (“blunt-end errors”) that increase the likelihood of 
errors, while avoiding the trap of focusing on mistakes by front-line individuals 
who participated in the event (“sharp-end errors”).21  The nexus of the RCA 
process is a multidisciplinary meeting of the investigation team, during which 
information collected by the RCA facilitator is presented, analyzed, and 
discussed with those individuals who were present at the event.22  In a criminal 
justice context, “sharp-end errors” may be those made by police, law 
enforcement investigators, or trial attorneys, while “blunt-end errors” may be 
those attributed to supervisors, policies, practices, office environment, etc. 
The RCA process is designed to answer four basic questions: 
(1) What happened? 
(2) Why did it happen? 
(3) What are the contributing factors? and, 
(4) What can be done to prevent it from happening again?23 
The RCA should lead to the creation of an action plan for process 
improvement that will prevent the adverse event or events from recurring in the 
future.  The RCA is typically conducted by a team of individuals with specific 
 
IMPROVEMENT 531, 531 (2002). 
17.  See Alexandra Lee et al., Root Cause Analysis of Serious Adverse Events Among 
Older Patients in the Veterans Health Administration, 40 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY & 
PATIENT SAFETY 253, 254 (2014).  
18.  See A. Zachary Hettinger et. al., An Evidence-Based Toolkit for the Development of 
Effective and Sustainable Root Cause Analysis System Safety Solutions, 33 J. HEALTHCARE 
RISK MGMT. 11, 11–20 (2013). 
19.  See William B. Runciman et al., Error, Blame, and the Law in Health Care – An 
Antipodean Perspective, 138 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 974, 974 (2003). 
20.  See Patient Safety Primer: Root Cause Analysis, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. 
QUALITY (July 2016), http://www.psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=10 
[https://perma.cc/R6KX-ZCWW] [hereinafter AHRQ RCA Primer]. 
21.  See REASON, supra note 7, at 9. 
22.  See Davide Nicolini et al., Policy and Practice in the Use of Root Cause Analysis 
to Investigate Clinical Adverse Events: Mind the Gap, 73 SOC. SCI. & MED. 217, 221 (2011). 
23.  See Root Cause Analysis: Tracing a Problem to Its Origins, MINDTOOLS, 
http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_80.htm [https://perma.cc/S5D5-Y6U3] 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
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expertise in the environment and activities that were conducted around the 
adverse event(s), as close as possible in time to the occurrence.24  The RCA 
team seeks to analyze the events from the perspective of the participants, based 
on their real-time knowledge of facts and circumstances, to avoid any 
retrospective bias that might negatively impact the ability of the RCA team to 
objectively identify modifications that will effectively prevent the recurrence of 
the adverse event(s).  The action plan generated by the RCA team reports on the 
redesign of systems and the implementation of improvements designed 
specifically to (1) reduce the risk of recurrence for the specific adverse events 
that occurred and (2) monitor the effectiveness of the proposed improvements.  
As a result, it is expected that the RCA will lead to recommendations that are 
materially different from those that would be generated from a disciplinary 
review board focused on the direct punishment of individual actors involved in 
the incident under review. 
An essential tenet of RCAs is that they are conducted in a blame-free 
manner.  The sole focus of the RCA is the identification of acts, omissions, or 
environmental factors that limit the ability of the system in question reliably to 
achieve desired outcomes.  While information allowing for the review of the 
performance of individual participants in the adverse event may be facilitated 
by the RCA investigation, such performance reviews, and any attendant 
disciplinary action, take place separately and apart from the RCA investigation 
itself.  This focus on safety (that is, reliable performance of the system as 
intended) as opposed to punishment is necessary to maximize the gathering of 
useful information from event participants, who might have an incentive to 
withdraw from the event review if their participation could lead to disciplinary 
measures.  It is important to stress that an RCA should be led by a facilitator, 
someone outside of executive leadership who is responsible for establishing 
action plans for all responsible parties.25  At the same time, organizations 
conducting RCAs recognize that professionals whose actions are intentional or 
reckless should be held accountable for their actions.  Thus, RCAs should 
happen within the context of a “just culture” that applies appropriate 
professional standards to the relevant workplace.  A “just culture” can be 
defined as a culture that “recognizes that competent professionals make 
mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will develop 
unhealthy norms (shortcuts, ‘routine rule violations’), but has zero tolerance for 
reckless behavior.”26  One way to blend the need for event reviews that 
prioritize safety with a just culture is to have the RCA team refer intentionally- 
 
24.  See Patricia M. Williams, Techniques for Root Cause Analysis, 14 BAYLOR UNIV. 
MED. CTR. PROC. 154, 154 (2001), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1292997/pdf/bumc0014-0154.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V6BC-CRDD]. 
25.  See Guidance for Performing Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with Performance 
Improvement Projects (PIPs), API, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-and-
certification/qapi/downloads/guidanceforrca.pdf [https://perma.cc/L37U-M4BE] (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter RCA Guidance]. 
26.  Glossary: J, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
https://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary/j [https://perma.cc/3DEE-65TB] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
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or recklessly-injurious activity to a separate disciplinary process within the 
organization.27 
A. Elements of a Successful RCA 
Local, state or federal institutions of the law should strive to be high-
reliability organizations (HROs).28  HROs rely on five hallmarks: 
(1) preoccupation with failure, (2) refusal to oversimplify, (3) sensitivity to 
operational change, (4) resilience in the face of error, and (5) deference to 
expertise.29  Within this context, there are a number of elements that should be 
included in a successful RCA, including organizational and structural elements, 
review of proposed solutions and implementation, education of relevant 
stakeholders, thorough analysis of policy changes, and checks on compliance.  
Foremost, an effective organization develops processes for selecting events 
requiring an RCA.30  In general, sentinel events—among the most serious—
should be selected for RCA.31  Organizational leadership must provide a charter 
to communicate the goals of the RCA,32 and the RCA facilitator should be 
appointed by—but not a member of—leadership, to avoid chilling the open 
communication from staff that is necessary for change.33 
RCAs assess particular elements of a system or process for the purpose of 
reducing errors and making constituents safer.34  Given the effort involved in 
bringing an RCA to fruition, the events chosen are generally of a serious 
nature35 and may require referral to external committees.  RCAs may also 
include debriefs with attorneys or staff involved after certain errors to identify 
points in the prosecution where interventions could have prevented a problem 
and to provide feedback.  Importantly, these reviews are not duplicative of the 
typical “internal affairs” review and, in the hands of experienced RCA 
reviewers, are likely to generate different questions, and therefore different 
 
27.  An example of this can be seen in the accident investigations conducted by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which takes the leadership position in the 
investigation of aviation, rail, and other transportation accidents instead of the FBI or other 
law enforcement organizations.  The NTSB’s sole focus is on improving the safety of the U.S. 
transportation network.  If, during the course of an investigation, the NTSB identifies the 
likelihood of criminal behavior, however, it will refer the investigation to the FBI and then 
take a “second-chair” role in the event review. 
28.  See Mark R. Chassin & Jerod M. Loeb, High-Reliability Health Care: Getting 
There from Here, 91 MILBANK Q. 459, 461–62 (2013), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3790522/pdf/milq0091-0459.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BKP-B78V]. 
29.  See KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: 
SUSTAINED PERFORMANCE IN A COMPLEX WORLD 7 (3d ed. 2015). 
30.  See RCA Guidance, supra note 25. 
31.  See Chassin & Loeb, supra note 28, at 461–62. 
32.  See AHRQ RCA Primer, supra note 20. 
33.  See id. 
34.  See PATIENT SAFETY: A CASE-BASED COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE xiv (Abha Agrawal 
ed., 2014). 
35.  See Tommaso Bellandi et al., Human Factors and Ergonomics in Patient Safety 
Management, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS IN HEALTH CARE AND 
PATIENT SAFETY 679 (Pascale Carayon ed., 2d ed., 2012). 
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information.  The RCA process is designed to shift analyses of errors toward a 
human-factors engineering approach; a search for system dysfunction rather 
than human error or other less actionable causes.36 
The context in which reviews are conducted and the expertise of the team 
members are two critical factors that deserve significant thought.  Follow-up of 
specific RCA reviews, especially those conducted by external committees, 
increases the complexity of implementing change.  External reviews risk 
abrogation of responsibility from the RCA team or others in the work group, 
causing the underlying issue to be lost to follow-up.  Ideally, domain experts 
from areas of concern will be embedded with the RCA team or asked to assist in 
error analysis and solution development.  Reviews that are performed 
transparently are likely to create sustainable and effective changes in culture.  
The best reviews are performed and shared with all interested stakeholders.  A 
critical function of the RCA team is to ensure assignments of implementation of 
recommendations as well as follow-up oversight of the implementation; 
otherwise, the RCA process will fail to correct errors.37 
Learnings from the RCA should be disseminated to all relevant individuals 
throughout the organization as soon as practicable after potentially-repeatable 
errors are identified.  A critical task is closing the feedback loop and creating an 
environment focused on error reduction. 
The cost and time needed to implement an RCA are typically reasonable 
and certainly can be viewed as important investments in office management, 
given the importance of preventing errors.  While changes to organizational 
structural elements occasionally require substantial, facility-wide investments 
involving significant capital outlay, time, and resources, such investments are 
the exception rather than the rule for RCA error-reduction solutions.  Examples 
include new IT platforms or additional office space for incremental hires.  
Location is important—for example, in medicine, ambulatory care and inpatient 
care have different spectra of errors.38  Within the criminal justice system, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, police officers, and judges can each be expected 
to be susceptible to different types of errors.  Because most prosecutors’ office-
based RCA teams will not possess specific expertise in RCA, such teams should 
consider the use of consultants such as the Quattrone Center or other objective 
third parties with experience prior to implementing any large-scale, high cost 
solutions.39  Although some jurisdictions prohibit public access to criminal 
investigative records, consultants may still be able to provide valuable insight 
 
36.  See Bagian et al., supra note 16, at 545. 
37.  See Julius Cuong Pham et al., ReCASTing the RCA: An Improved Model for 
Performing Root Cause Analyses, 25 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 186, 187 (2010). 
38.  See generally Traber Davis Giardina et al., Root Cause Analysis Reports Help 
Identify Common Factors in Delayed Diagnosis and Treatment of Outpatients, 32 HEALTH 
AFF. 1368 (2013). 
39.  There is a potential political benefit to the office in seeking assistance from outside 
consultants in the review—such a review is likely to be perceived as more independent, and 
thus, its conclusions are likely to be seen as more objective and trustworthy by observers 
(media, etc.) who might otherwise continue to criticize the office for managing the 
investigation internally.  However, in Pennsylvania, only law enforcement personnel may 
review criminal investigative information. 
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regarding administrative and structural issues. 
B. Education and Counseling Solutions 
Organizations need to provide continuing educational opportunities and 
performance feedback to staff that facilitate—and to the extent possible 
participate in—RCA teams.40  There are going to be solutions where education 
is the primary goal, which may focus on individuals or groups.  Training may 
focus on educating staff regarding a new technology.  Education may also 
consist of lectures and testing of attorneys and staff in a more formal didactic 
setting.  Common examples include orientation of new staff members, learning 
in simulated environments, educational “minutes” during staff meetings, or 
educational updates regarding existing legal policies and procedures.  
Educational solutions work best where a knowledge deficit was identified as an 
important causative factor.  For example, there may be cases in which staff 
members did not know how to analyze evidence or are unaware of changes in 
relevant statutory law.  Education should not address a serious system problem 
such as poor workflow, confusing interfaces with law enforcement, inefficient 
processes, or poorly designed policies.  Single education sessions, e.g. training 
modules during new staff orientation, are unlikely to provide sustained error 
reduction, especially if policies and procedures taught during orientation do not 
match the “real world” settings in which the errors may arise.  Educational 
solutions should focus on methods that incorporate contexts in which error-
prone situations may occur and environmental simulation where it is safe to 
learn failure.  Educational solutions ideally are continuing events, as the 
knowledge base is lost if not refreshed. 
C. Counseling for Error: The Second Victim 
Once the RCA has been conducted and the facts surrounding the event in 
question are known, management of the organization must counsel individuals 
within the organization on how to avoid recurrence of the error(s).  Counseling 
focuses on individuals who participated in the generation of the error(s) and 
typically involves providing constructive feedback, plans for personnel 
development, or ultimately referral out of the RCA framework for disciplinary 
review and action.  Counseling recommendations are generally directed to 
involved personnel and may be couched in terms like “all involved staff were 
counseled on relevant policies and procedures.”  Such solutions are diminished 
by focusing only on those individuals who were involved in the adverse event 
under review, as these individuals may be the least likely to repeat the same 
errors. 
If an individual was acting recklessly or without regard to safety processes, 
then, according to principles of a just culture, there may be a role for 
 
40.  See Paul Bowie et al., Training Health Care Professionals in Root Cause Analysis: 
A Cross-Sectional Study of Post-Training Experiences, Benefits and Attitudes, 13 BMC 
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 50, 57 (2013), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/50 
[https://perma.cc/46WV-KL9T]. 
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sanctions.41  But most individual errors are a result of slips or lapses that can be 
reduced or eliminated only through better systems and process design.42  
Counseling of only affected personnel will have limited to no effect on other 
individuals who are at risk of similar error-prone situations.  Counseling 
typically has negative connotations and may adversely impact personnel’s 
willingness to report errors that did not affect justice.  Counseling—in a 
different light—is important for “second victims,” defined as personnel 
experiencing feelings of guilt, shame, and depression, and should be provided in 
the immediate post-event period. 
Professionals in many industries with zero tolerance for errors may suffer 
with the realization that their conduct contributed to or caused an error that led 
to an adverse event or injury to another human being.  Although there is a 
scarcity of published data on the effects of errors on criminal justice 
professionals, the data on medical errors and unanticipated bad patient 
outcomes on healthcare workers can be instructive.  A culture of “shame and 
blame” has been thought to affect healthcare quality by decreasing error 
reporting.43  Blame-related distress may also be a factor in burnout, compassion 
fatigue, and, especially, the second victim syndrome.44  Support resources 
provided by healthcare organizations to prevent and reduce second victim-
related harm often are inadequate.45  One analysis identified six stages in the 
natural history of the second victim phenomenon: “(1) chaos and accident 
response, (2) intrusive reflections, (3) restoring personal integrity, (4) enduring 
the [investigation], (5) obtaining emotional first aid, and (6) moving on.”46 
Training is necessary, but insufficient, to inoculate professionals against 
the effects of making errors—especially single-incident training.  Counseling 
should be provided not only to the individuals involved, but to anyone who 
might make the same error.  Counseling might include managing out of the 
organization or other sanctions if behaviors were intentional, reckless, or 
grossly negligent.  Managers should be aware that protecting good faith actors 
and sanctioning bad faith actors is important to cultural acceptance of any just 
culture analysis, implemented process, or proposed reform. 
The prevalence of second victims after an adverse event has been reported 
 
41.  See SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE: BALANCING SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
87–99 (2012). 
42.  See James Reason, A Systems Approach to Organizational Error, 38 ERGONOMICS 
1708, 1710–12 (1995); see also REASON, supra note 7, at 9. 
43.  See Judy E. Davidson et al., Workplace Blame and Related Concepts: An Analysis 
of Three Case Studies, 148 CHEST 543, 543 (2015), 
http://journal.publications.chestnet.org/article.aspx?articleID=2289067 
[https://perma.cc/XX54-C7MY]. 
44.  See id. at 546 (citing B.J. Horak et al., Crossing the Quality Chasm: Implications 
for Health Services Administration Education, 21 J. HEALTH ADMIN. EDUC. 15 (2004)). 
45.  See generally Jonathan D. Burlison et al., The Second Victim Experience and 
Support Tool (SVEST): Validation of an Organizational Resource for Assessing Second 
Victim Effects and the Quality of Support Resources, 00 J. PATIENT SAFETY 2014, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4342309/ [https://perma.cc/QZ89-TNZF]. 
46.  See S.D. Scott et al., The Natural History of Recovery for the Healthcare Provider 
“Second Victim” After Adverse Patient Events, 18 QUALITY SAFETY HEALTH CARE 325, 325, 
326, 329 tbl.5 (2009). 
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variably from 10.4% to 43.3%.47  The coping strategies used by second victims 
have an impact on their patients, colleagues, and themselves.  After the adverse 
event, defensive as well as constructive changes have been reported in practice.  
The second victim phenomenon may also have a significant impact on 
clinicians, colleagues, and subsequent patients.48 
At one time or another, virtually all physicians make a medical error that 
harms a patient.49  At such times, the physician can feel singled out, exposed, 
worried that others have noticed, and concerned about potential ramifications.  
There is agony about what to do, who to tell, what to say.  Thoughts of the 
event may become intrusive.  One questions one’s competence, but fears being 
discovered.  Physicians (as well as lawyers) have an ethical requirement to 
disclose errors depending on the circumstance, but fears of punishment and of 
the patient’s reprisal are associated with dread.50 
In a survey of 1,160 healthcare providers, 15% had experienced patient 
safety events causing personal problems in the aftermath of the error, including 
depression, anxiety, or concerns about their ability to perform their jobs as a 
result of an adverse event.  Of these, 39% seriously contemplated leaving their 
profession.51  In a follow-up study, the same authors found that 30% of 898 
clinicians had experienced emotional distress after a major adverse event within 
the previous year.52  Hanan H. Edrees and colleagues found that two-thirds of 
140 clinicians surveyed at a patient safety meeting had experienced emotional 
problems related to an adverse event.53  Guilt, responsibility, and failure were 
common feelings in healthcare providers after a patient’s death, even when not 
due to medical error.54  7,905 members of the American College of Surgeons 
were asked whether they had experienced suicidal ideation within the past year, 
and 501 (6.3%) said “yes,” and suicidal ideation was strongly associated with 
medical error.55  1,294 Norwegian physicians were similarly studied, and 368 
(28%) were involved in an adverse clinical event.  Of those, 17% reported a 
significant impact upon their personal lives.56  Clinical symptoms may include 
anxiety, sleeplessness, difficulty concentrating, depression, a feeling of loss of 
 
47.  See Deborah Seys et al., Health Care Professionals As Second Victims After 
Adverse Events: A Systematic Review, 36 EVALUATION & HEALTH PROFS. 135, 146 (2013) 
(citing three separate studies on second victims in health care). 
48.  See id. at 149. 
49.  See Wu et al., supra note 16, at 727. 
50.  See id. 
51.  See Scott et al., supra note 46, at 328 tbl.4. 
52.  See Susan D. Scott et al., Caring for Our Own: Deploying a Systemwide Second 
Victim Rapid Response Team, 36 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 233, 234 
(2010). 
53.  See Hanan H. Edrees et al., Health Care Workers As Second Victims of Medical 
Errors, 121 POLISH ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 101, 108 (2011). 
54.  See Farnaz M. Gazoni et al., Life After Death: The Aftermath of Perioperative 
Catastrophes, 107 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 591, 597 tbl.2 (2008). 
55.  See Tait D. Shanafelt et al., Special Report: Suicidal Ideation Among American 
Surgeons, 146 ARCHIVES SURGERY 54, 56 (2011). 
56.  See O.G. Aasland &  R. Førde, Impact of Feeling Responsible for Adverse Events 
on Doctors’ Personal and Professional Lives: The Importance of Being Open to Criticism 
From Colleagues, 14 QUALITY SAFETY HEALTH CARE 13, 15 (2005). 
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss6/2
2017] ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 25 
personal integrity, and irritability.57  As a bridge from medical studies to the 
justice system, similar types of stressors affect the police.58  One study 
documented that 63% of police respondents stated that a critical incident 
debriefing would be beneficial following an extremely stressful event related to 
duty.59 
D. Providing Assistance After the Error or Adverse Event 
Although there is a dearth of literature on the effects of errors on 
prosecutors, by analogy, there are data on other professions such as medicine.  
After making errors, healthcare professionals would like support in a variety of 
ways.  One study of family medicine physicians is instructive.60  Of twenty-
seven physicians surveyed, seventeen (63%) wished to talk with someone who 
would be nonjudgmental about the error.61  Sixteen (59%) wanted affirmation of 
competence as a healthcare professional by reviewing the event.62  Thirteen 
(48%) hoped for validation of the fateful decision, and eight (30%) wanted 
affirmation of their personal self-worth.63  Pratt and colleagues have developed 
a toolkit to help healthcare organizations support healthcare providers who may 
suffer from the emotional impact of medical errors.  The toolkit consists of ten 
modules, each consisting of specific actions, best evidence references, and 
examples.64 
Organizations can help deal with both the adverse event and its aftermath.65  
Organizational efforts may include blame-free, process-oriented, analysis of 
systems errors to help alleviate self-blame and doubt.  Organizations should 
offer support to healthcare providers after errors or bad outcomes.  Individuals 
who provide assistance (employee assistance programs, wellness counselors) 
should make clear that a need for support is not a sign of weak character.  
Education about the legal process might reduce anxiety should a claim be 
anticipated.  The role of the risk managers should be presented in advance, 
preferably before an error or bad outcome, so the healthcare team knows how to 
utilize risk management services.  Lastly, training or retraining where 
appropriate might empower the affected individuals to get past the event.  One 
 
57.  See Andrew A. White & Thomas H. Gallagher, After the Apology—Coping and 
Recovery After Errors, 13 AM. MED. ASS’N. J. ETHICS 593, 594–95 (2011), 
http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2011/09/pdf/ccas1-1109.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LX2-
K5N9]. 
58.  See Matthias Berking et al., Enhancing Emotion-Regulation Skills in Police 
Officers: Results of a Pilot Controlled Study, 41 BEHAV. THERAPY 329, 337–38 (2010). 
59.  See generally Holly M. Robinson et al., Duty-Related Stressors and PTSD 
Symptoms in Suburban Police Officers, 81 PSYCHOL. REP. 835 (1997). 
60.  See generally Marc C. Newman, The Emotional Impact of Mistakes on Family 
Physicians, 5 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 71 (1996). 
61.  See id. at 71. 
62.  See id. 
63.  See id. 
64.  See generally Steven Pratt et al., How to Develop a Second Victim Support 
Program: A Toolkit for Health Care Organizations, 38 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY & 
PATIENT SAFETY 235 (2012). 
65.  See CHARLES VINCENT, PATIENT SAFETY 139–51 (1st ed. 2006). 
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commentator has suggested that sharing one’s own perceived errors may also 
help provide support.66 
Policy learnings generated by an RCA typically are focused on 
reinforcement of existing policies and procedures or changes to individual 
policies without significant change to underlying processes, physical 
environment, or information systems.  A common example is to reinforce 
knowledge of personnel on existing or recently changed policies via circulars, 
newsletters, e-mails, or meetings.  Frequently, personnel can confirm attendance 
by a sign-in sheet.  For example, district attorney’s offices may send a memo to 
all assistant DAs to remind them of policies regarding evaluation of laboratory 
or other complex evidence.  Policy changes alone, however, without significant 
changes to the education of individuals, are likely to have limited effectiveness 
and/or sustainability.  RCA teams can implement larger sets of changes that 
make policy solutions more likely to be sustainable and effective.  Policies 
designed to reinforce reasoned process changes may be instituted concomitantly 
with appropriate education and needed changes to IS infrastructure or 
workspace.  Top-down organizational policy changes mandated that lack 
supporting effort are unlikely to create effective change.  Further, RCA 
solutions that require significant administrative efforts (i.e., enforcement and 
compliance) have high costs to be sustainable and effective.  Invariably, new 
organizational priorities surface, and there is only so much that can be 
monitored and reported upon without devoting more resources or reallocating 
existing resources. 
Compliance with RCA solutions is focused on reviews of case files or 
other metrics for the purpose of monitoring or regulating procedural success.  
Data allow an organization to evaluate what works and what does not.  
However, it is wrong to conclude that only measurement is important in 
management.67  Compliance checks may consist of audits, for example, where 
personnel are observed to verify they are subjecting evidence to external 
analysis or verifying victim DNA identification.  Observations may give a sense 
of what is being done, but observations frequently suffer from the Hawthorne 
effect, the name for a phenomenon by which variables not accounted for in 
social or behavioral experiments exert unexpected influence when workers 
know they are being observed.68  As a result, observed rates of compliance 
should be assumed to be lower in non-observed workflow.  Successful 
implementation rates also characteristically drop to a baseline after compliance 
checks are no longer, especially if there was no accompanying change to 
education or environment.  Case file reviews for compliance are retrospective, 
robust sources of data, but labor-intensive, consuming significant human and 
other resources.  Such reviews often give little meaningful feedback to 
personnel on how to improve the system.  Organizations should calculate the 
 
66.  See Newman, supra note 60, at 73. 
67.  See W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEW ECONOMICS FOR INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, 
EDUCATION 35 (2d ed. 2000). 
68.  See Daniel Nelson, Book Review, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 209, 209–10 (1993) 
(reviewing RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANUFACTURING KNOWLEDGE: A HISTORY OF THE 
HAWTHORNE EXPERIMENTS (1991)). 
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downstream effects of any long-term compliance commitments or reporting 
requirements; they can quickly trump limited time resources, such that more 
time is spent reporting than in actively decreasing errors. 
IV. THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY RCA 
A. Case Sequence of Events 
According to court documents, the victim attended a social gathering with 
colleagues from work and was driven home by her employer.  She recalled his 
bringing a bottle of wine into the vehicle and offering her a glass.  She largely 
lost consciousness for the rest of the evening, with only a few spotty memories 
of events.  She woke up the next morning with soreness and multiple bruises on 
her body as well as significant gaps in her memory about the events of the 
previous night.  Her memories led her to believe that she had been sexually 
assaulted, and she had family members take her to the hospital one and a half 
days later.  The hospital treated her injuries, performed a sexual assault 
examination, and took samples for testing. 
Later that week, the victim contacted law enforcement and told them what 
happened to her.  The victim initially went to the Upper Merion Police 
Department.  When they learned the substance of her allegations, they contacted 
the MCDB, who took over the case and formally interviewed her.  In the days 
following her statement to law enforcement, she was contacted by the hospital 
and verbally given some of the test results.  Her understanding of the verbal test 
results, based on a conversation with hospital staff, was that zolpidem, a “date 
rape drug,” had been detected in her system in trace amounts.  After speaking 
with the hospital staff, the victim contacted an investigator with the MCDB to 
advise the investigator of her conversation about the test results.  Law 
enforcement subsequently obtained additional medical records from the hospital 
as well as the lab report containing the test results for zolpidem. 
The lab that performed the tests was not the lab usually used by the District 
Attorney’s Office, so the Deputy District Attorney (DDA) and Detective 
managing the investigation were not accustomed to the format of the results.  
When the Deputy District Attorney and Detective reviewed the report, they saw 
a listing for zolpidem and a quantity they interpreted as suggesting an 
identifiable amount of zolpidem, rather than a zero that would indicate no 
amount.  As understood by the DDA and Detective, the test results appeared 
consistent with the victim’s reported conversation with hospital staff.  This lab 
report was written such that it led the Deputy District Attorney and Detective to 
believe there were trace elements of zolpidem in the victim’s blood when, in 
fact, there were none.  The DNA analysis showed the suspect’s DNA on the 
button of the victim’s pants and on the inside of the waistband of her 
underwear.  The hospital exam showed clear injuries indicative of forceful 
vaginal penetration, which were consistent with sexual assault. 
The suspect was a local politician who was the chairman of the political 
party with which the elected District Attorney was affiliated.  Though she felt 
no personal conflict of interest in handling a case involving this man, the 
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District Attorney was concerned about the appearance of a conflict of interest 
and the potential public perception that a conflict could exist.  To avoid the 
appearance of impropriety, the District Attorney referred the investigation to the 
Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.  In her letter to the Attorney 
General (AG), the DA requested the AG take over the case based upon the 
potential appearance of a conflict of interest.  At the same time, she directed her 
staff to continue the investigation so that no evidence would be lost, and she 
assigned a county detective and an experienced deputy district attorney as the 
team for investigating this high-profile case.  The Pennsylvania Attorney 
General declined to assume the case, so it fell to the District Attorney to make 
charging decisions and prosecute the case, if necessary. 
Additional investigation was conducted, including investigative interviews 
with the suspect and others.  The investigation was submitted to the 
Montgomery County Investigating Grand Jury.  Included in the presentation of 
evidence to the Grand Jury was the lab report, which was described as reflecting 
trace amounts of zolpidem in the victim’s blood.  The Grand Jury voted and 
issued a presentment recommending to the District Attorney that she file 
charges against the suspect.  The District Attorney accepted the presentment 
and recommendation of the Grand Jury and authorized the filing of a criminal 
complaint against the defendant.  The defendant was arrested and arraigned for 
rape of an unconscious victim and related charges. 
The case progressed in customary fashion through the court system.  The 
Commonwealth presented its case at a preliminary hearing, at which time 
certain evidence was presented, including the lab report.  The detective testified 
that the report demonstrated that an identifiable level of zolpidem had been 
found within the victim’s blood.  As a result, the charges against the defendant 
were held for court.  As part of pretrial discovery, the deputy district attorney 
sent a copy of the lab report to the defense attorney.  Upon reviewing the report, 
the defense attorney informed the deputy district attorney that he could not find 
the alleged level of zolpidem listed within the report.  As a result, the 
Commonwealth quickly consulted with experts and determined that it had 
misinterpreted the report which, in fact, did not indicate the presence of 
zolpidem and brought this concern to the attention of the deputy district 
attorney, who then shared it with the District Attorney.  The District Attorney 
directed her staff to review the matter, and all agreed that the analysis of the lab 
report previously conducted by the office was in error.  The District Attorney 
also considered the various instances in which this erroneous interpretation had 
been represented by the DA’s Office, including its presentation to the Grand 
Jury, its inclusion in the criminal complaint, and its introduction as evidence 
during a preliminary hearing.  There was no suggestion that the error was 
intentional on the part of any individual; in fact, defense counsel advised the 
DA that he believed it was entirely unintentional.  Given all of the preceding 
facts, however, the DA believed that she had no choice but to dismiss the 
charges and start from the beginning.  At that point, the DA concluded that her 
office had an actual conflict of interest in reconsidering the matter, and she 
referred the case to the Office of the Attorney General for the second time.  This 
second referral, unlike the first, was based upon an actual conflict of interest 
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cited by the DA.  The Attorney General accepted the referral and took over the 
case.  The Attorney General’s Office reviewed the investigation and made its 
own independent charging decision, refiling most of the same charges that had 
originally been filed.  The defendant eventually pled no contest to misdemeanor 
indecent assault.69 
B. RCA Procedural Framework 
The RCA team assembled by the Quattrone Center for the Fair 
Administration of Justice consisted of two healthcare professionals, an 
anesthesiologist and a general surgeon, with experience in RCAs in a healthcare 
environment; one employee of the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) with experience as an investigator of transportation accidents; and one 
attorney familiar with the workings of prosecutors’ offices.  The RCA team met 
with the investigative team created by the DA’s Office to investigate the 
incident in question, which consisted of the District Attorney, the First Assistant 
District Attorney, the Chief County Detective, and the Deputy Chief County 
Detective of the MCDB, which exists within the District Attorney’s Office.  
Facilitation for the RCA was provided by the Quattrone Center members. 
The RCA team conducted a thorough interview of the Investigative Team 
to get a detailed chronology of events leading up to and including the 
investigational error and to understand the conclusions of the Investigative 
Team regarding the motivations and situational understandings held by the 
ADA and her investigator throughout their management of the case.  The RCA 
Team created a chronology of the case investigation from the commission of the 
criminal events through the discovery of the error.  Based on the interview with 
the Investigative Team and subsequent follow-up sessions, the RCA Team 
identified several factors that were believed to contribute to the creation of an 
environment that allowed the investigative error to occur, to be used in 
charging, and to be shared with the public and with defense counsel.  The RCA 
Team organized these areas, along with specific factors within each area, in an 
Ishikawa or “fishbone” diagram for review by the Investigation Team and 
senior management within the DA’s Office (see Figure, below). 
Once an agreed upon set of environmental factors was completed, the RCA 
Team generated a draft action plan (Table) with proposed actions that would 
address active, latent, supervisory, and environmental factors that may have 
helped cause the adverse event and presented this draft to senior management in 
the DA’s Office.  The DA’s Office evaluated the draft action plan and provided 
suggested revisions back to the RCA Team, who subsequently provided a final 
version back to the DA’s Office.  Senior management within the DA’s Office 
provided a memo to the County Commissioners explaining the results of the 
RCA and seeking their support to implement—qualitatively and with budget 
 
69.  See Brad Segall, Former GOP Official in Montco Sentenced for ‘Indecent Contact’ 
With Co-Worker (Nov. 24, 2014, 11:03 AM), 
http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2014/11/24/former-gop-official-in-montco-sentenced-for-
indecent-contact-with-co-worker/ [https://perma.cc/RU5R-LKVH]. 
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assistance—the proposed reforms.  This support was given, and the reforms 
have been implemented within the DA’s Office. 
As part of its recommendations, the RCA Team also provided guidance to 
senior management within the DA’s Office on the importance of recommending 
reforms that were implementable within the culture and environment of the 
DA’s Office and methods for communicating and implementing the proposed 
reforms that would maximize their adoption within the DA’s Office.  Process 
changes that are not embraced by line personnel are per se ineffective in 
modifying behavior, and, therefore, will not be effective in eliminating the 
recurrence of the adverse event in question. 
C. Factors Contributing to Error 
The primary factors contributing to error identified by the internal review 
involved: 
 A failure to accurately interpret the lab report based 
upon flawed assumptions made by those initially 
reviewing the report and shared with their 
supervisors.  This failure included technical 
misinterpretation of the lab report on the part of the 
deputy district attorney and of the county detective 
assigned to the case; 
 Atypical communication from the victim with regard 
to scientific evaluations of the case; 
 Ineffective communication within the team and from 
the team to colleagues (informal) and supervisors; 
 A lack of independent review of the investigative 
team; 
 Failure to seek expert assistance to evaluate the lab 
report; and 
 Pressure caused by external factors such as the 
potential conflict of interest due to the suspect’s 
position and the concurrent open referral to the 
Attorney General’s Office and the intense media 
attention the case was generating. 
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FIGURE.  “FISHBONE” OR ISHIKAWA DIAGRAM USED BY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
TEAM. 
D. Observations from the RCA Team 
1. Human Factors Related to the Report Contributed to Its Misinterpretation 
by the Investigator and ADA 
The toxicology report was generated by a laboratory not typically used by 
the DA’s Office, as the report had been ordered by the hospital where the victim 
first presented, rather than being ordered by law enforcement personnel.  As a 
result, its format and content were unfamiliar to the assigned investigator and 
the ADA, leading to a risk of misinterpretation of information.  Furthermore, 
the substantive contents of the report were confusing.  The report listed the 
minimum detectable amount/level necessary for the lab to identify the presence 
of zolpidem and indicated that the sample lacked detectable amount of 
zolpidem.  Unfortunately, neither the assigned Detective nor the Deputy District 
Attorney recognized that the report documented no detectable levels of 
zolpidem, and proceeded as if the minimum detectable level listed in the report 
was instead the amount of zolpidem detected within in the victim’s blood. 
2. Atypical Communications Related to the Report Contributed to Its 
Misinterpretation by the Detective and ADA 
Normal procedure within the DA’s Office for a toxicology test requested 
by law enforcement personnel is for the lab to send the test results back to the 
requesting ADA or investigator.  In this case, however, because the hospital that 
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treated the victim requested testing, hospital personnel received the report and 
communicated results to the victim directly.  The victim subsequently 
communicated her erroneous understanding of the results to the Detective, who 
then communicated those same results to the DDA (along with the potential for 
confirmation bias, a potential that appears to have been realized). 
3. A Lack of Supervision, Exacerbated by the Environment of Confidentiality 
Created by the District Attorney, Had an Unintended Chilling Effect on the 
Willingness of the Detective and ADA to Seek Assistance 
The DA’s Office has an extensive training program for its ADAs that pre-
dates the events described in this paper.  Although supervisors within the Office 
have an “open door policy” and pride themselves on being available to consult 
with ADAs and review cases to ensure high-quality prosecutions, each 
individual ADA or investigator is expected to elevate necessary questions or 
concerns about any individual case to colleagues and supervisors, rather than 
requiring the supervisor to review each specific case. 
In this instance, the defendant was a prominent political figure in the 
region.  As a result, the allegations were the subject of considerable media 
scrutiny, and the DA’s Office received a constant stream of calls and questions 
regarding the investigation and its status.  In addition, the DA and other 
supervisors within the DA’s Office were extremely sensitive to the risk that the 
community would feel that political considerations might influence the charging 
decision, and they were also mindful of the potential harm caused by unfounded 
accusations.  Thus, the assigned DDA and Detective on the case were instructed 
to communicate only with certain supervisors about the investigation.  They 
were further told not to share information with other colleagues or to 
communicate by e-mail.  This admonition of confidentiality was intended to 
protect both the defendant and victim until all facts had been uncovered.  The 
instructions had the unintended consequence, however, of reducing the ability 
of the DDA and Detective to follow normal practice and review the case with 
other personnel within the DA’s Office. 
It was and is a consistent part of the daily practice of the DA’s office for 
ADAs and detectives to discuss ongoing cases with their colleagues and peers, 
creating an informal system of checks, balances, and strategic ideas that may 
help to reduce errors.  By including others and discussing cases, these law 
enforcement professionals get the benefit of the training, experience, 
perspective, and knowledge of other highly trained professionals.  ADAs and 
detectives use their colleagues as additional “eyes” on a problem, to get other 
opinions, and to identify factors in the case that the assigned ADA might have 
missed or to which improper weight might have been given.  In this instance, 
the instruction from the DA Office’s leadership to limit intra-Office 
communication about the case had the unintended consequence of removing 
this case from that informal “peer review” process.  As a result, the lab report in 
question was not carefully reviewed by other personnel within the office, one of 
whom could reasonably have identified the interpretive error before it was 
relied upon by the investigative team.  There are no facts suggesting that the 
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interpretive error regarding zolpidem was intentional.  Rather, available 
information demonstrates that the ADA and Detective acted in good faith 
throughout the case. 
V. THE RCA TEAM’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
RCAs are collaborative processes that benefit from a team approach.  RCA 
investigative team members must be carefully assigned; have clearly defined 
roles; continually question facts, hypotheses, and conclusions; and encourage 
outside input and supervision throughout the investigation.  Such a 
responsibility is necessary to guard against “confirmation bias,” in which an 
investigator following a hypothesis gives unwarranted weight to facts that agree 
with one’s own hypothesis and/or minimizes or disregards nonconforming facts. 
Proper interpretation of data gathered during an investigation is mandatory, 
particularly in cases where information is received from multiple, disparate 
sources, often in non-standard formats.  In the case at issue in this RCA, 
inaccurate conclusions were drawn from a single laboratory report.  
Contributing factors included an unfamiliar report format, an initial explanation 
of the report’s contents coming from a layperson rather than a medical expert, 
failure to consult relevant laboratory personnel, and minimal communication 
between the investigative team and supervisors caused by concerns over leaks 
regarding details about the investigation before its conclusion.  Such 
communication failures suggest a role for a “devil’s advocate” independent of 
the investigation to further challenge existing assumptions and ensure that all 
data is fully tested.  Such advocates would also help ensure that charging and 
other decisions are based only on provable facts. 
ADAs in Montgomery County, like their colleagues in most jurisdictions 
throughout the United States, maintain hundreds of active case files 
simultaneously, and they bear responsibility for the outcome in each case.  
Therefore, measures must be in place to ensure that errors do not occur due to 
excessive case management burdens. 
A. Implementation of Best Practices 
Best practices concerning criminal investigative matters are extremely 
challenging to implement, maintain, and enforce in Montgomery County.  This 
difficulty can be attributed to the existence of forty-nine independent and 
largely autonomous police departments within Montgomery County.  Only the 
MCDB is under the direct management of the DA’s Office, and thus in virtually 
all other instances, the implementation of best practices in the investigation of 
crime is entirely in the discretion of senior management for the police 
department in question.  The DA’s Office may directly implement best practices 
within the MCDB, but cooperation from police chiefs and the community is 
essential to effectuate county-wide changes.  Significant measures thought to be 
immediately available include refinements in charging decisions, review teams, 
and training programs to help ensure accurate and appropriate case outcomes. 
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B. Charging Determinations 
The DA’s Office often advises law enforcement personnel regarding 
charging decisions such as whether criminal offenses should be charged, and if 
so, which offenses are appropriate.  New policies were implemented so that 
supervisory prosecutors—whose duty it is to ensure that charged offenses are 
appropriate under the circumstances and supported by sufficient evidence—
advise police requesting consults for charging decisions.  Pilot programs, 
including training for prosecutors and law enforcement partners were developed 
for early case review and prosecutorial approval of charges in the busiest 
jurisdictions. 
C. Investigative Review Teams 
Within the MCDB, review teams were formed to facilitate communication 
between personnel, allowing for better critical evaluation regarding 
investigative matters.  Local criminal procedure rules were adopted so that the 
police must obtain prior approval from the DA or an approved ADA for search 
warrants and for filing certain criminal charges with regard to sex offense and 
homicide cases.  Further, documents that contain technical information or other 
specialized data require independent review by objective and competent experts 
in that specialty before they are used in court or elsewhere.  A network of 
available experts will be identified and maintained, all of whom are available on 
an “as-needed” basis. 
D. A Just Culture 
The RCA team considered how to integrate a culture that balances 
transparency and “blame-free” support of good-faith, conscientious actors—
who may from time to time, nonetheless, make an unintentional mistake—with 
individual accountability and an awareness of the complexity of the job.  
Learning from errors cannot happen without awareness of errors, which requires 
a “just culture” that addresses the mistake and accurately assesses the 
responsibility of the individuals involved.  Individuals performing their duties in 
good faith will be mentored when possible and receive support, thereby 
improving the entire system.  However, those individuals who act recklessly or 
wrongfully will be trained, disciplined, and, when appropriate, terminated from 
the District Attorney’s Office. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE MONTGOMERY  
COUNTY DA’S OFFICE 
A. Restructuring and Staff Proposals 
1. Bureau Accreditation and Implementation of Best Practices: Chief and 
Deputy Chief County Detectives 
The RCA identified the need for formal accreditation of the MCDB as part 
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of the development of best practices regarding its investigative systems.  The 
accreditation will be from the Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Accreditation 
Program, introduced by the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Association in 
2001.70  Since then, 300 agencies have enrolled, and 96 agencies have become 
accredited, including the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office and many other 
local police departments within the county.  The DA’s Office has begun the 
process to obtain accreditation for the MCDB. 
Accreditation has long been known to help with the evaluation and 
improvement in the overall performance of law enforcement organizations.  The 
keystone of accreditation as an organizational improvement tool lies in the 
development of standards setting out clear professional objectives.  
Accreditation requires the MCDB to establish an enhanced framework for 
evaluating agency practices and procedures.  Accreditation has also been shown 
to increase employee productivity and reduce the risk of lawsuits, with the 
expected decrease in liability insurance expenditures.71  In short, accreditation 
provides a foundation for enhanced public accountability and transparency. 
The Chief and Deputy Chief County Detectives were both noted to have 
received extensive training concerning law enforcement investigations and 
matters related to professionalism.  Both are intimately familiar with office 
structure, office personnel, and the necessary elements for criminal prosecution.  
As such, each of them was deemed capable of identifying best practices to 
strengthen the MCDB’s underlying investigations.  Further, their existing job 
position descriptions provide sufficient independence and authority to 
implement necessary best practices within the Bureau. 
Therefore, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Detective Bureau were 
assigned main responsibility for establishing and enforcing investigative-related 
procedures throughout the Bureau to ensure investigative accuracy and 
integrity.  Likewise, the Chief and Deputy Chief are also responsible for 
obtaining Bureau accreditation from the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police 
Association. 
Integrity-related measures have been found to be most effective when 
directed toward the entire investigative and prosecutorial process, as significant 
criminal investigations often continue after arrest through trial.  Investigative 
actions that occur within this context can only be addressed in a meaningful 
fashion by select personnel, such as the Chief and Deputy Chief, who possess 
not only the sufficient authority, but also broad familiarity with office structure, 
attorneys, and the necessary mechanics of case prosecution.  Traditionally, the 
Chief and Deputy Chief have been expected to focus their duties and to direct 
their daily activities toward the management of criminal investigations and the 
immediate supervision of Bureau personnel.  Expanding the responsibilities of 
the Chief and Deputy Chief Detective to include identification and 
implementation of best practices for improving investigative accuracy and 
 
70.  See PCPA Accreditation Program, PA. CHIEFS OF POLICE ASS’N, 
http://www.pachiefs.org/pcpa-accreditation-program [https://perma.cc/9G4D-2FZK] (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
71.  See id. 
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responsibility for accreditation efforts was considered to represent an effective 
and appropriate extension of their respective positions. 
2. Deputy District Attorney for Professional Standards 
The internal review conducted by the Investigation Team, as well as the 
RCA conducted by the RCA Team, suggested that the most effective method to 
ensure investigative accuracy and appropriate prosecutorial outcomes would be 
to implement systems and controls as front-end system checks.  As a result, a 
new Deputy District Attorney (DDA) for Professional Standards was 
established to implement these checks and was envisioned as an alternative to 
the concept advanced by a small number of district attorneys throughout the 
county—the formation of Conviction Integrity Units (CIU).  CIUs review cases 
where newly discovered evidence suggests that an inaccurate conviction might 
have occurred.  These units are exclusively reactive in nature, and while post-
conviction reviews are certainly needed, they can only redress past errors. 
The RCA further determined that prosecutors have insufficient time to 
properly focus on “blunt end” arrest and charging determinations.  Additional 
experienced, unbiased personnel are needed to adequately conduct case status 
reviews before charging decisions are made.  Such reviews would ideally 
include examination of the sufficiency of case evidence, efforts to ensure 
accurate charging, checks on prosecutorial discretion and strategy, and 
compliance with legal and ethical obligations.  All are necessary to ensure 
appropriate outcomes. 
In order to effectively ensure the prosecutorial integrity of all criminal 
cases, regardless of subject matter or specialization, the DA’s Office established 
a Deputy District Attorney (DDA) position responsible for implementing and 
enforcing Professional Standards.  This DDA serves as an ombudsman, 
operating independently from existing units and divisions in order to maintain 
objectivity.  The DDA has been granted sufficient authority to evaluate all cases 
within the Office, implement meaningful review processes, and take necessary 
action to ensure appropriate investigative and prosecutorial outcomes.  The new 
DDA assesses decisions made by prosecutors, including supervisory personnel 
and reports directly to the District Attorney and First Assistant District 
Attorney. 
The Professional Standards DDA satisfies the critical need of front-end 
review by reviewing investigative findings and charging decisions.  This 
individual evaluates cases that have not had the benefit of prior supervisory 
review and serves as a resource to address particular complaints or concerns 
about specific cases.  Finally, this DDA implements procedures to identify and 
analyze “near misses,” in an effort to continuously improve existing best 
practices. 
3. Assistant Chief of Trials Division, Assistant District Attorney 
The Trials Division is the largest Unit within the DA’s Office, consisting 
of twenty-nine Assistant District Attorneys.  In response to the RCA, the Office 
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created a new mid-level supervisory position, Assistant Chief of the Trials 
Division.  The new Assistant Chief assists the Chief with supervising all 
Division personnel and has supervisory authority over the other prosecutors 
assisted by eight Unit Captains.  Most cases prosecuted within Montgomery 
County are assigned to ADAs within the Trials Division.  The Division’s 
attorneys average in excess of two hundred cases, although some individuals 
may be responsible for more than four hundred cases. 
The DA’s Office considered whether such caseloads were inappropriate 
and might contribute to errors in the administration of justice.  Although the 
caseloads have remained constant for many years within the DA’s Office, the 
management of the office ultimately determined that the appropriate action was 
not to increase the number of ADAs substantially.  Instead, they chose a more 
measured response that would address the issue, while ensuring full attention to 
all relevant elements of existing cases.  Consequently, the new Assistant Chief 
is also tasked with sufficiency of evidence determinations, workload 
assessments and serves in a similar “ombudsman” role to the DDA for 
Professional Standards, addressing those cases prosecuted within the Trials 
Division. 
The RCA noted that the first review any ADA has of a criminal case is 
often at the file review stage, well after an arrest and shortly before a 
defendant’s formal arraignment.  At the earliest opportunity, cases require 
analysis and a determination on whether all charges are supported by sufficient 
evidence.  The Assistant Chief of the Trials Unit is the senior level prosecutor 
working with the ADAs in the division and is ultimately responsible for making 
accurate determinations on sufficiency of evidence.  When the evidence is 
deemed insufficient, the Assistant Chief exercises discretion not to prosecute.  
The Assistant Chief also oversees workload issues to ensure that individual 
caseloads are manageable and that each case receives appropriate attention.  
The Assistant Chief provides service as “devil’s advocate,” ensuring that cases 
are objectively evaluated before proceeding with further prosecution.  
Importantly, the Assistant Chief serves as a point of entry for those outside of 
the DA’s Office requesting independent review for a specific case.  Such 
requests might come from a law enforcement officer, a victim, a defense 
attorney, or a judge. 
B. Long-Term Quality Improvement Initiatives 
Measurement is a critical part of testing and implementing change.  
Recommendations generated by the RCA are only useful in improving the 
safety of a system if they are implemented and evaluated (and hopefully 
optimized) over time.  Thus, quality improvement efforts focus not on 
individual events, but on measuring trends in relevant metrics that validate 
whether changes implemented lead to improvement.  A combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data is more informative than either alone. 
The criminal justice system, and prosecutors’ offices in particular, is 
largely barren of metrics that evaluate whether a prosecutor or an office is a 
high quality minister of justice.  Conviction rates and case management rates 
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provide some insight into the efficiency of the office’s ability to gain 
convictions, but most participants agree that this is only one part of a 
prosecutor’s role within the criminal justice system and within the community.  
Additional roles include validating appropriate investigation techniques and 
outcomes, protecting victims and helping them heal from their injuries, 
reducing recidivist behavior, and ensuring appropriate sentences.  In 
measurement science, there is a concept of balancing measures.72  As one 
example, conviction rates could be balanced by post-conviction exonerations.  
Thus, no metrics exist to measure fully the recommendations implemented by 
the DA’s Office in this instance. 
VII. LIMITATIONS 
The RCA process has been criticized for a number of reasons.73  Four 
elements have been suggested as preventing optimization of the RCA process in 
further decreasing errors.74  These obstacles are not unique to healthcare, are 
equally applicable to the law, and should be considered by any organization 
seeking to implement an RCA process.  First, the process of performing an 
RCA lacks standardization from organization to organization.  Second, RCA 
teams are not always successful at identifying the root cause for why an event 
truly occurred.  Third, the causes identified in the RCA may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to implement.  Lastly, RCAs may be conducted independently, with 
each root cause uniquely addressed, and no attempt to identify trends that could 
be addressed systemically. 
There were also shortcomings in the RCA as described here.  Although the 
Montgomery County RCA addressed a number of issues, it was not possible to 
explore fully every learning or RCA precept.  To solve the widest range of 
issues, RCAs should include involved personnel as team members for insight 
regarding the error.  RCA interviews are more susceptible to recall bias, and 
direct observations of workflow and processes are useful but time consuming.  
Involved personnel might relate what they thought was the right answer and not 
necessarily workflow as practiced.  For this reason, participation should be 
voluntary, with no individually-identifiable participant information recorded.  
Attorneys, in particular, could add important viewpoints regarding the 
sustainability and effectiveness of proposed RCA solutions.  There is evidence 
that staff members attribute effectiveness and sustainability to those solutions 
involving training, policy, and compliance.75  Because such recommendations 
require considerable administrative resources to implement it is important to 
 
72.  See Elizabeth Martinez et al., Quality Improvement and Patient Safety, in 
MILLER’S ANESTHESIA 92 (Ronald Miller ed., 8th ed. 2014). 
73.  See Jonny Taitz et al., System-Wide Learning From Root Cause Analysis: A Report 
from the New South Wales Root Cause Analysis Review Committee, 19 QUALITY SAFETY 
HEALTH CARE 63, 66–67 (2010), http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/19/6/e63.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2B2Q-LJAE]. 
74.  See Thomas Diller et al., The Human Factors Analysis Classification System 
(HFACS) Applied to Health Care, 29 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 181, 181–82 (2014). 
75.  See Hettinger, supra note 18, at 18–19. 
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss6/2
2017] ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 39 
assure their effectiveness.  Consequently, direct workflow observations and 
cost-benefit analyses may be required to assess feasibility and ensure 
effectiveness rather than mere “user satisfaction.”  Lastly, to be truly effective, 
RCAs should be conducted expeditiously.  The ideal in some healthcare settings 
is within seven days.  Analyses temporally distant from errors are more likely to 
introduce errors in memory, relevance, and incentives to improve. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Application of the RCA process in a criminal justice context, as developed 
in other professions such as healthcare, aviation, and fire prevention, has the 
potential to produce an effective and sustained reduction of errors in the legal 
system.  The process starts with the differing insights and experiences that the 
appropriate group of individuals brings to bear, including those with intimate 
knowledge of daily workflows.  The RCA team must be committed to exploring 
the systems-level factors that created the error-prone environment, but with an 
appreciation of just culture76 when evaluating the individuals who were 
involved with a given event.  This RCA may serve as a blueprint for analysis of 
errors in many legal settings to determine if effective and sustainable learnings 
and their implementation can be applied to reduce future prosecutorial errors.  
Identifying and engineering systems-level solutions may prevent error-prone 
situations, creating sustainable and effective change and leading to the fairer 
administration of justice.  In Montgomery County, the new positions of Deputy 
District Attorney for Professional Standards and Assistant Chief for the Trials 
Division are expected to provide an effective and efficient means by which to 
address quality control and to ensure appropriate case outcomes throughout the 
Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office.  In summary, the RCA found 
that front-end review and quality assessment are critical to accuracy and 
fairness, while ongoing review of cases is mandatory to help ensure, at all 
times, that the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office is operating at 
the highest levels of professionalism and accuracy. 
 
 
76.  See DEKKER, supra note 41, at 89. 
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RCA Name: MDA_Evidence
Learnings Action Plan 
Potential 
Impact Accountable Due date Completed Date
Assess alternatives to MontCo investigation Medium
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Develop protocol for assigning prosecutors 
and detectives to high profile cases.  
Experience working independently within a 
team structure and prior history with other 
team members is a positive. High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Develop supervisory team for high profile 
cases, including roles - devil's advocate, 
independent evidence review, definition of 
"high profile" High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Consider legislative approaches to 
standardizing cases. Medium
DA/MontCo 
Legislative 
Lobby 
Law enforcement decision on where to send 
victim for appropriate tests can standardize Medium
County 
detectives
Standardization of processing victims across 
hospitals 'Name of the game, Keep things 
the same.' High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Develop process/protocol for hospital 
informing Montco DA (police?) of rape kit 
administration and results (within HIPAA) Medium Hospitals
Develop process for obtaining/archiving  
duplicate samples for analysis by preferred 
lab. Medium
County 
detectives
Develop process for communication with 
hospital - consent to disclose form. Medium
County 
detectives
Develop process for independent verification 
of victim statements. High
County 
detectives
Develop process for independent verification 
of victim statements. High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Make current process more explicit, or re-
educate staff. High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Develop teams who can 
anticipate/complement each other's work. Medium
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Consider meaningful evaluation of data by 
someone outside investigation team (perhaps 
even outside MontCo DA's office) during 
investigation stage.  Medical expert or 
defense attorney on call to act as 
interpreter/devil's advocate Medium
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Ensure each member of investigation team is 
comfortable questioning conclusions and 
actions of the other members of the team, 
and reporting concerns upward High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Formalize process for review of data during 
investigation stage High
County 
detectives
Identify chains of communication when leaks 
are a concern; 'Who do you trust?' High
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Protocol for who investigation team can 
speak to on cases with media attention Medium
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Protocol for calls coming in inquiring about 
case status to non-investigation team 
personnel Medium
DA/1st Asst 
DA
Media scrutiny led to communication 
problems.
Event &Reported Date:                                                               RCA Date:5/29/12
High-publicity case with potential for 
political pressure and potential for 
perceived conflict of interest.  State AG 
declined to accept case. 
Process of gathering data was unusual 
because victim went to hospital before 
reporting allegations to police/DA. Hospital 
to hospital transfer, local rape procedures 
carried out, lab tests sent to non-MontCo 
lab.
Points of communication about lab data 
were unusual and DA's first contact was 
from victim, who was not an expert.  
Hospital nurse spoke to victim; victim 
misunderstood conversation; victim relayed 
incorrect information to county detective.
No independent review within DA's Office 
but outside investigation team  of data 
submitted to GJ.
Neither investigator nor Asst DA  
independently verified lab data. 
TABLE: DRAFT ACTION PLAN 
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